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Abstract
We develop a decentralized Bayesian model of college admissions with two
ranked colleges, heterogeneous students and two realistic match frictions: students
nd it costly to apply to college, and college evaluations of their applications
are uncertain. Students thus face a portfolio choice problem in their application
decision, while colleges choose admissions standards that act like market-clearing
prices. Enrollment at each college is aected by the standards at the other college
through student portfolio reallocation. In equilibrium, student-college sorting may
fail: weaker students sometimes apply more aggressively, and the weaker college
might impose higher standards. Applying our framework, we analyze armative
action, showing how it induces minority applicants to construct their application
portfolios as if they were majority students of higher caliber.
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college applications data.
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The college admissions process has lately been the object of much scrutiny, both from
academics and in the popular press. This interest owes in part to the competitive nature
of college admissions. Schools set admissions standards to attract the best students, and
students in turn respond most judiciously in making their application decisions. This
paper examines the joint behavior of students and colleges in equilibrium.
We introduce an equilibrium model of college admissions that analyzes the impact of
two previously unexplored frictions in the application process: students nd it costly to
apply to college, and college evaluations of their applications is uncertain. As evidence
of the noise in the process, observe that admissions rates are well below 50% at the
most selective colleges, and below 75% at the median 4 year college.1 This uncertainty
prevails conditional on the SAT. Even applicants with perfect SAT scores have no better
than a 50% chance of getting into schools like Harvard, MIT and Princeton (Avery,
Glickman, Hoxby, and Metrick, 2004). So it is not surprising that most applicants
construct thoughtful portfolios that include both \safety" and \stretch" schools.
Despite this uncertainty, the costly nature of applications substantially limits the
number of applications sent | three for the median student.2 A fast growing empirical
literature conrms the impact of this friction: for instance, Pallais (2009) nds that
when the ACT allowed students to send an extra free application, 20% of ACT test-
takers took advantage of this option.3 Small costs can have large eects on application
behavior because the marginal benet of applying falls geometrically in the number
of applications. A student applying to identical four-year colleges with a typical 75%
acceptance rate sees the marginal benet to her 5th application scaled by 4 4 = 1=256:
Even if attending college this year is worth $20000, the marginal benet is only $59.
Figure 1 illustrates some motivating patterns in the application data. The left panel
demonstrates the importance of the application frictions | for the chance of matric-
ulating at a private elite school is signicantly higher for students who apply widely.4
The right panel plots the average number of applications as a function of the SAT score,
1Source: Table 329, Digest of Education Statistics, National Center for Education Statistics.
2Source: Higher Education Research Institute (HERI), using a large nationally representative survey
of college freshman since 1966 (data also used to construct Figure 1; see online appendix for details).
3Steinberg (2010) reported that colleges who waived application fees saw applications skyrocket.
4Avery and Kane (2004) study a Boston program giving low-income students advice on how/where to
apply; these students matriculated at a higher rate than comparable students elsewhere. Similar results
have later been found in eld experiments where students received application help: see Bettinger,
Long, Oreopoulos, and Sanbonmatsu (2009) and Carrell and Sacerdote (2012).
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Figure 1: Applications and Matriculation by SAT. The left panel shows the chance of
matriculating at a top private university, by number of applications and household income. The
right panel shows the estimated relationship between SAT score and number of applications.
Estimation is by local linear regression; 95% condence intervals are shown as dotted lines.
small but larger than one consistent with our two frictions.5
Any model that focuses on these two frictions | costly portfolio choices with incom-
plete information | must diverge from the approach of the centralized college matching
literature (Gale and Shapley, 1962), for it expressly sidesteps such matching frictions.
Rather, we analyze an entirely decentralized model that parallels the actual process. It
aords sharp conclusions about two key decision margins: how colleges set admission
standards and how students formulate their application portfolios.
We assume a heterogeneous population of students, and two ranked colleges | one
better and one worse, respectively, called 1 and 2. Like the decentralized model of Avery
and Levin (2010), there is a continuum of students; this avoids colleges facing aggregate
uncertainty | otherwise, wait-listing is needed, for instance.6 Colleges seek to ll their
capacity with the best students possible, but student calibers are only imperfectly ob-
served. The tandem of costly applications and yet noisy evaluations feeds the intriguing
conict at the heart of the student choice problem: shoot for the Ivy League, settle
for the local state school, or apply to both. As we shall see, our paper formalizes the
critical roles played by stretch and safety schools. Meanwhile, college enrollments are
5Admissions rates fall rapidly as college rank rises. So larger portfolios are particularly valuable for
high SAT students applying to top-tier colleges, consistent with the right panel of Figure 1.
6See Che and Koh (2013) for a college admissions model with aggregate uncertainty. We also
omit many real-world elements like nancial aid and peer eects, but these are typically ruled out in
centralized matching models too. In a recent paper, Azevedo and Leshno (2012) assume a continuum
of students in a centralized paper in the spirit of Gale and Shapley (1962), and nd that it aords a
characterization of equilibrium in terms of supply and demand | one of our observations too.
2interdependent, since the students' portfolios depend on the joint college admissions
standards, and students accepted at the better college will not attend the lesser one.
This asymmetric interdependence leads to many surprising results.
Central to our paper is a theorem characterizing how student acceptance chances at
the colleges covary with student caliber. We deduce that as a student's caliber rises,
the ratio of his admission chances at college 1 to college 2 rises monotonically. We are
thus able to solve the equilibrium in three stages, rst deducing how acceptance chances
translate into application portfolios, and then seeing how portfolio choices across student
calibers relate, for any pair of college admission standards; nally, we compute the
derived demand for college slots. We analyze the equilibrium of the induced admissions
standards game among colleges through the lens of supply and demand: When a college
raises its standards, its enrollment falls both because fewer students make the cut |
the standards eect | and fewer will apply ex ante | the portfolio eect. Treating
admissions standards as prices, these eects reinforce each other. In equilibrium, we
uncover a \law of demand", in which a college's enrollment falls in its standard. The
portfolio eect increases the elasticity of this demand curve.
Analogous to Bertrand competition with dierentiated products, colleges will choose
admissions standards to ll their desired enrollment, taking rival standards and the
student portfolios as given. An equilibrium occurs when both markets clear and stu-
dents behave optimally. The model frictions yield some novel comparative statics. For
instance, the admissions standards at both colleges fall if college 2 raises its capacity,
while lower application costs at either school increase the admissions standards at the
better college. We will argue that our equilibrium framework rationalizes the pattern of
changing college standards and admission rates recently documented by Hoxby (2009).
In a major thrust of the paper, we ask whether sorting occurs in equilibrium: First,
do the better students apply more \aggressively"? Precisely, the best students apply just
to college 1; weaker students insure by applying to both colleges; even weaker ones apply
just to college 2; and nally, the weakest apply nowhere. Such an application pattern
rationalizes the general rise and fall that we observe in the right panel of Figure 1.
Second, does the better college impose higher admissions standards? The answer to this
question is no when the lesser college is suciently small, for by our \law of demand",
college 2 continues to raise its standards as its capacity falls. Failures of student sorting
are more subtle: The willingness of students either to (i) gamble on a stretch school or (ii)
insure themselves with a safety school may not be monotone in their types. Conversely,
3all equilibria entail sorting when the colleges dier suciently in quality and the lower
ranked school is not too small. All told, sorting proves elusive with frictions.7 The college
sorting failures that we identify have problematic implications for rankings based on the
characteristics of matriculants, such as their SAT scores: Colleges that substantially
increase their capacity are penalized, since they must lower their admission standards.
This paper takes very seriously the uncertainty that clouds the student admission
process. Students apply to colleges, perhaps knowing their types, or perhaps ignorant
of them. Equally well, colleges evaluate students trying to gauge the future stars, and
often do not succeed. The best framework for analyzing this world therefore involves
two-sided incomplete information. In fact, we later formulate such a richer Bayesian
model, and argue that its predictions are well-approximated by ours where students
know their types, and colleges observe noisy signals. The sorting failures we claim, as
well as the positive theory of how students and colleges react, are in fact robust ndings.
We conclude the paper with a topical foray into \armative action" for in-state
applicants, or other preferred applicant groups. We show that colleges impose dierent
admissions standards so as to equate the \shadow values" of applicants from dierent
groups | a form of third degree price discrimination. This, in turn, aects how students
behave: in a simple case, lower caliber applicants of a favored group behave as if they
were higher caliber applicants from a non-favored group. This is consistent with the
reduction in less-qualied minority applications to selective public schools after the end
of armative action in California and Texas, documented in Card and Krueger (2005).
2 The Model
A. An Overview. The paper introduces three key features | heterogeneous students,
portfolio choices with unit application costs, and noisy evaluations by colleges. We
impose little additional structure. For instance, we ignore the important and realistic
consideration of heterogeneous student preferences over colleges, as well as peer eects.
A central feature of our analysis is modeling college portfolio applications. Student
choice is trivial if it is costless, and in practice, such costs can be quite high. Indeed, the
7This adds to the literature on decentralized frictional matching | e.g., Shimer and Smith (2000),
Smith (2006), Chade (2006), and Anderson and Smith (2010). The student portfolio problem in the
model is a special case of Chade and Smith (2006). In this sense, our paper also contributes to the
directed search literature. See Burdett and Judd (1983), Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001), Albrecht,
Gautier, and Vroman (2003) and Kircher and Galenianos (2006)).
4sole purpose of the Common Application is to lower the cost of multiple applications.8
Next, we assume noisy signals of student calibers. This informational friction cre-
ates uncertainty for students, and a Bayesian ltering problem for colleges. It captures
the diculty faced by market participants, with students choosing \safety schools" and
\stretch schools", and colleges trying to infer the best students from noisy signals. With-
out noise, sorting would be trivial: Better students would apply and be admitted to
better colleges, for their caliber would be correctly inferred and they would be accepted.
We also make two other key modeling choices. First, we assume just two colleges, for
the sake of tractability. But as we argue in the conclusion, this is the most parsimonious
framework that captures all of our key ndings. We also x the capacity of the two
colleges. This is defensible in the short run, and so it is best to interpret our model as
focusing on the \short run" analysis of college admissions. We explore the simultaneous
game in which students apply to college, and colleges decide whom to admit.9
In the interest of tractability, our analysis assumes that the colleges' evaluations
of students are conditionally independent. This captures the case where students are
apprised of all variables (such as the ACT/SAT or their GPA) common to their appli-
cations before applying to college. Students are uncertain as to how these idiosyncratic
elements such as college-specic essays and interviews will be evaluated, but believe
that the resulting signals are conditionally independent across colleges. We revisit this
restriction in Section 6, and argue that our main results on sorting are robust, and that
we have analyzed a representative case.
B. The Model. There are two colleges 1 and 2 with capacities 1 and 2, and a
unit mass of students with calibers x whose distribution has a positive density f(x) over
[0;1). Non-triviality demands that college capacity be insucient for all students, as
1 + 2 < 1. To avoid many subscripts, we shall almost always assume that students
pay a separate but common application cost c > 0 for the two colleges. All students
prefer college 1. Everyone receives payo v > 0 for attending college 1, u 2 (0;v) for
college 2, and zero payo for not attending college. Students maximize expected college
8This general application form is used by almost 400 colleges, and simplies college applications. It
eliminates idiosyncratic college requirements, but retains separate college application fees.
9Epple, Romano, and Sieg (2006) analyze an equilibrium model that includes tuition as a choice
variable, price discrimination, peer eects, and students that dier in ability and income. Under single
crossing conditions, they obtain positive sorting on ability for each income level. Their model, however,
does not include costly applications or noise, thus precluding the portfolio eects we focus on and their
implications for sorting. While we do not allow colleges to choose their tuition levels, we do not ignore
the role of tuition, for one can simply interpret the benets of attending college as net benets.
5payo less application costs. Colleges maximize the total caliber of their student bodies
subject to capacity constraints.
Students know their caliber, and colleges do not. Colleges 1 and 2 each just ob-
serves a noisy conditionally independent signal of each applicant's caliber. In particular,
they do not know where else students have applied. Signals  are drawn from a condi-
tional density function g(jx) on a subinterval of R, with cdf G(jx). We assume that
g(jx) is continuous and obeys the strict monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP).
So g(jx)=g(jx) is increasing in the student's type x for all signals  >.
Students apply simultaneously to either, both, or neither college, choosing for each
caliber x, a college application menu S(x) in f?;f1g;f2g;f1;2gg. Colleges choose the
set of acceptable student signals. They intuitively should use admission standards to
maximize their objective functions, so that college i admits students above a threshold
signal  i. Appendix A.1 proves this given the MLRP property | despite an acceptance
curse that college 2 faces (as it may accept a reject of college 1).
For a xed admission standard, we want to ensure that very high quality students
are almost never rejected, and very poor students are almost always rejected. For this,
we assume that for a xed signal , we have G(jx) ! 0 as x ! 1 and G(jx) ! 1
as x ! 0. For instance, exponentially distributed signals have this property G(jx) =
1   e =x. More generally, this obtains for signals drawn from any \location family", in
which the conditional cdf of signals  is given by G((   x)=), for any smooth cdf G
and  > 0 | e.g. normal, logistic, Cauchy, or uniformly distributed signals. The strict
MLRP then holds if the density is strictly log-concave, i.e., logG0 is strictly concave.
C. Equilibrium. We consider a simultaneous move game by colleges and students.
This yields the same equilibrium prediction as when students move rst, as they are
atomless.10 An equilibrium is a triple (S();
1;
2) such that:
(a) Given (
1;
2), S(x) is an optimal college application portfolio for each x,
(b) Given (S();
j), college i's payo is maximized by admissions standard 
i.
We also wish to preclude trivial equilibria in our model in which one or both colleges
reject everybody with a very high admissions threshold and students do not apply there.
10See Appendix A.2. Alternatively, colleges could move rst, committing to an admission standard.
This is arguably not the case, but regardless, it too yields the same equilibrium properties until we
study armative action (proof omitted). In the interests of a unied treatment throughout the paper,
we proceed in the simultaneous move world.
6A robust equilibrium also requires that any college that expects to have excess capacity
set the lowest admissions threshold. Since 1+2<1, both colleges will have applicants.
In a robust sorting equilibrium, colleges' and students' strategies are monotone. This
means that the better college is more selective (
1 > 
2) and higher caliber students
are increasingly aggressive in their portfolio choice: The weakest apply nowhere; better
students apply to the \easier" college 2; even better ones \gamble" by applying also to
college 1; the next tier up applies to college 1 while shooting an \insurance" application
to college 2; nally, the top students condently just apply to college 1. Monotone
strategies ensure the intuitive result that the distribution of student calibers at college 1
rst-order stochastically dominates that of college 2 (see Claim 3 in Appendix A.7), so
that all top student quantiles are larger at college 1. This is the most compelling notion
of student sorting in our environment with noise (Chade, 2006).
Our concern with a robust sorting equilibrium may be motivated on eciency grounds.
If there are complementarities between student caliber and college quality, so that wel-
fare is maximized by assigning the best students to the best colleges, any decentralized
matching system must necessarily satisfy sorting to be (constrained) ecient. Since
formalizing this idea would add notation and oer little additional insight, we have ab-
stracted from these normative issues and focused on the positive analysis of the model.
D. Common versus Private Values. Notice that in our model colleges care about
the true caliber of a student and not about the signal per se. In other words, the model
exhibits common values on the side of the colleges. Appendix A.1 shows colleges behave
in exactly the same way if they do not care about caliber but care only about the signal
i.e. the private values case. In this interpretation, students dier in their observables x
(known to both students and colleges), and also in their \t" for each college i (known
only to the college). College payos depend on both observables and t through the
signal i  i(x;i). Until the armative action application in Section 7, all the results
apply to the private values case as well, albeit with a dierent interpretation.
3 Equilibrium Analysis for Students
3.1 The Student Optimization Problem
We begin by solving for the optimal college application set for a given pair of admission
chances at the two colleges. Consider the portfolio choice problem for a student with
7admission chances 0  1;2  1. The expected payo of applying to both colleges
is 1v + (1   1)2u. The marginal benet MBij of adding college i to a portfolio of
college j is then:
MB21  [1v + (1   1)2u]   1v = (1   1)2u (1)
MB12  [1v + (1   1)2u]   2u = 1(v   2u) (2)
The optimal application strategy is then given by the following rule:
(a) Apply nowhere if costs are prohibitive: c > 1v and c > 2u.
(b) Apply just to college 1, if it beats applying just to college 2 (1v  2u), and
nowhere (1v  c), and to both colleges (MB21 < c, i.e. adding college 2 is worse).
(c) Apply just to college 2, if it beats applying just to college 1 (2u  1v), and
nowhere (2u  c), and to both colleges (MB12 < c, i.e. adding college 1 is worse).
(d) Apply to both colleges if this beats applying just to college 1 (MB21  c), and
just to college 2 (MB12  c), for then, these solo application options respectively
beat applying to nowhere, as 1v > MB12  c and 2u > MB21  c by (1){(2).
This optimization problem admits an illuminating and rigorous graphical analysis.
The left panel of Figure 2 depicts three critical curves: MB21 = c;MB12 = c, 1v = 2u.
All three curves share a crossing point, since MB21 = MB12, when 1v = 2u.
Cases (a){(d) partition the unit square into (1;2) regions corresponding to the
portfolio choices (a){(d), denoted ;C2;B;C1, shaded in the right panel of Figure 2.
This summarizes the portfolio choice of a student with any admissions chances (1;2).
In the marginal improvement algorithm of Chade and Smith (2006), a student rst
decides whether she should apply anywhere. If so, she asks which college is the best
singleton. In Figure 2 at the left, college 1 is best right of the line 1v = 2u, and
college 2 is best left of it. Next, she asks whether she should apply anywhere else.
Intuitively, there are two distinct reasons for applying to both colleges that we can now
parse: Either college 1 is a stretch school | i.e., a gamble, added as a lower-chance
higher payo option | or college 2 is a safety school, added for insurance. In Figure 2,
these are the parts of region B above and below the line 1v = 2u, respectively.
The choice regions obey some natural comparative statics. The application region
Ci to either college increases in its payo, in light of expressions (1) and (2), and the
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Figure 2: Optimal Decision Regions. The left panel depicts (i) a dashed box, inside
which applying anywhere is dominated; (ii) the indierence line for solo applications to col-
leges 1 and 2; and (iii) the marginal benet curves MB12 = c and MB21 = c for adding
colleges 1 or 2. The right panel shows the optimal application regions. A student in the blank
region  does not apply to college. He applies to college 2 only in the vertical shaded region C2;
to both colleges in the hashed region B, and to college 1 only in the horizontal shaded region C1.
region B expands rightwards in the college 2 payo u, and leftwards in the college 1
payo v. In particular, if a student enjoys xed acceptance rates at the two colleges, a
college grows less attractive as the payo of its rival rises. Also, as the application cost c
rises, the joint application region B shrinks and the empty set  grows.
Although outside our model, let us briey consider non-linear costs | for instance,
the second application costs may be less than c, possibly due to some duplication of
forms, essays, etc. We analyze this in the online appendix, and show that region B is
bigger and the remaining regions smaller than with constant costs. Interestingly, some
types who would send no singleton applications would nonetheless apply to both colleges.
3.2 Admission Chances and Student Calibers
We have solved the optimization for known acceptance chances. But we wish to predict
the portfolio decisions of the students, despite the endogenous acceptance chances. To
this end, we now derive a mapping from student types to student application portfolios.
Fix the thresholds  1 and  2 set by college 1 and college 2. Student x's acceptance
chance at college i, i = 1;2, is given by i(x)  1   G( ijx). Since a higher caliber
student generates stochastically higher signals, i(x) increases in x. In fact, it is a
smoothly monotone onto function | namely, it is strictly increasing and dierentiable,
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Figure 3: The Acceptance Function with Exponential Signals. The gure depicts
the acceptance function  (1) for the case of exponential signals. As their caliber increases,
students apply to nowhere (), college 2 only (C2), both colleges (B) | specically, rst using
college 1 as a stretch school, and later college 2 as a safety school | and nally college 1
only (C1). Student behavior is therefore monotone for the acceptance function depicted.
with 0 < i(x) < 1, and the limit behavior limx!0 i(x) = 0 and limx!1 i(x) = 1.
Taking the acceptance chances as given, each student of caliber x faces the portfolio
optimization problem of x3.1. She must choose a set S(x) of colleges to apply to, and
accept the oer of the best school that admits her. We now translate the sets ;C2;B;C1
of acceptance chance vectors into corresponding sets of calibers, namely, ;C2;B;C1.
Key to our graphical analysis is a quantile-quantile function relating student admis-
sion chances at the colleges: Since i(x) strictly rises in the student's type x, a student's
admission chance 2 to college 2 is strictly increasing in his admission chance 1 to
college 1. Inverting the admission chance in the type x, the inverse function (;)
is the student type accepted with chance  given the admission standard , namely
1   G(j(;)). This yields an implied dierentiable acceptance function
2 =  (1; 1; 2) = 1   G( 2j(1; 1)) (3)
We prove in the appendix that the acceptance function rises in college 1's standard  1
and falls in college 2's standard  2, and tends to 0 and 1 as thresholds near extremes.
By Figure 3, secant lines drawn from the origin or (1;1) to successive points along the
acceptance function decrease in slope. To this end, say that a function h : [0;1] ! [0;1]
has the double secant property if h() is weakly increasing on [0;1] with h(0) = 0,
10h(1) = 1, and the two secant slopes h()= and (1   h())=(1   ) are monotone in .
This description fully captures how our acceptance chances relate to one another.
Theorem 1 (The Acceptance Function) The acceptance function 2 =  (1) has
the double secant property. Conversely, for any smooth monotone onto function 1(x),
and any h with the double secant property, there exists a continuous signal density g(jx)
with the strict MLRP, and thresholds  1; 2, for which admission chances of student x
to colleges 1 and 2 are 1(x) and h(1(x)).
This result gives a complete characterization of how student admission chances at two
ranked universities should compare. It says that if a student is so good that he is
guaranteed to get into college 1, then he is also a sure bet at college 2; likewise, if he
is so bad that college 2 surely rejects him, then college 1 follows suit. More subtly, we
arrive at the following testable implication about college acceptance chances:
Corollary 1 As a student's caliber rises, the ratio of his acceptance chances at college 1
to college 2 rises, as does the ratio of his rejection chances at college 2 to college 1.
For an example, suppose that caliber signals have the exponential density g(jx) =
(1=x)e =x. The acceptance function is then given by the increasing and concave geo-
metric function  (1) = 
 2= 1
1 , as seen in Figure 3 (as long as college 2 has a lower
admission standard). The acceptance function is closer to the diagonal when signals
are noisier, and farther from it with more accurate signals.11 For an extreme case, as
we approach the noiseless case, a student is either acceptable to neither college, both
colleges, or just college 2 (assuming that it has a lower admission standard). The  
function tends to a function passing through (0;0), (0;1), and (1;1).12
Since a student's decision problem is unchanged by ane transformations of costs and
benets, we henceforth assume a payo v = 1 of college 1; so, college 2 pays u 2 (0;1).
Throughout the paper, we also realistically assume that application costs are not too high
relative to the college payos | specically, c < u(v u)=v = u(1 u) and c < u=4. The
rst inequality guarantees that the curves MB21 = c and MB12 = c do not cross twice
inside the unit square.13 The second inequality ensures that the MB21 = c curve crosses
11Specically, for the earlier location-scale family,  (1) rises in the signal accuracy 1= (see Persico
(2000)). Easily, the acceptance function tends to the top of the box in Figure 3 as  ! 0, since
 (1) = 1   G( 1) = 1, and to the diagonal  (1) = 1   G(0 + G 1(1   1)) = 1 as  ! 1.
12The limit function is not well-dened: If a student's type is known, just these three points remain.
13For if 2 = 1, then MB21 = c and MB12 = c respectively force 1 = 1 (c=u) and 1 = c=(v  u).
Now, 1   (c=u) > c=(v   u) exactly when c < u(1   u)=v.
11below the diagonal.14 If either inequality fails, the analysis trivializes since multiple
college applications are impossible for some acceptance functions, as they are too costly.
4 Equilibrium Analysis for Colleges
4.1 A Supply and Demand Approach
Each college i chooses an admission standard  i as a best response to its rival's threshold
 j and the student portfolios. With a continuum of students, the resulting enrollment
Ei at colleges i = 1;2 is a non-stochastic number (recall that i(x)  1   G( ijx)):
E1( 1; 2) =
Z
B[C1
1(x)f(x) dx (4)
E2( 1; 2) =
Z
C2
2(x)f(x) dx +
Z
B
2(x)(1   1(x))f(x) dx; (5)
suppressing the dependence of the sets B, C1 and C2 on the student application strategy.
To understand (4) and (5), observe that caliber x student is admitted to college 1 with
chance 1(x), to college 2 with chance 2(x), and nally to college 2 but not college 1 with
chance 2(x)(1   1(x)). Also, anyone that college 1 admits will enroll automatically,
while college 2 only enrolls those who either did not apply or got rejected from college 1.
If we substitute optimal student portfolios into the enrollment equations (4){(5),
then they behave like demand curves where the admissions standards are the prices. Our
framework aords analogues to the substitution and income eects in demand theory.
The admission rate of any college obviously falls in its anticipated admission standard |
the standards eect. But there is a compounding portfolio eect | that enrollment also
falls due to an application portfolio shift. Each college's applicant pool shrinks in its own
admissions threshold. We then deduce in the appendix the \law of demand": If a college
raises its admission standard, then its enrollment falls. Because of our portfolio eect,
a college faces a more elastic demand for slots than predicted purely by the standards
eect. A lower admission bar will invite applications from new students.15
The law of demand applies outside the two college setting. For intuition, suppose that
the admissions standard at a college rises. Absent any student portfolio changes, fewer
14For MB21 = c has no roots on the diagonal 2 = 1 if c > u=4.
15The portfolio eect may act with a lag | for instance, a college may unexpectedly ease admission
standards one year, and see their applicant pool expand the next year when this becomes understood.
12students meet its tougher admission threshold (the standards eect), and its enrollment
falls. The portfolio adjustment reinforces this eect. Those who had marginally chosen
to add this college to their portfolios now excise it (the portfolio eect).
In consumer demand theory, the \price" of one good aects the demand for the other,
and in the two good world, they are substitutes. Analogously, we prove in the appendix,
that a college's enrollment demand rises in its rival's admission standard. This owes to
a portfolio spillover eect. If it grows tougher to gain admission to college i, then those
who only applied to its rival continue to do so, some who were applying to both now
apply just to j (which helps college j when it is the lesser school), and also some at the
margin who applied just to i now also add college j to their portfolios.16
Since capacities imply vertical supply curves, we have justied a supply and de-
mand analysis, in which the colleges are selling dierentiated products. Ignoring for now
the possibility that some college might not ll its capacity, equilibrium without excess
capacity requires that both markets clear:
1 = E1( 1; 2) and 2 = E2( 1; 2) (6)
Since each enrollment (demand) function is falling in its own threshold, we may invert
these equations. This yields for each school i the threshold that \best responds" to its
rival's admissions threshold  j so as to ll their capacity i:
 1 = 1( 2;1) and  2 = 2( 1;2) (7)
Given the discussion of the enrollment functions, we can treat i as a \best response
function" of college i. It rises in its rival's admission standard and falls in its own ca-
pacity. That is, the admissions standards at the two colleges are strategic complements.
Figure 4 depicts a robust equilibrium as a crossing of these increasing functions.
By way of contrast, observe that without noise or without application costs, the
better college is completely insulated from the actions of its lesser rival | 1 is vertical.
The equilibrium analysis is straightforward, and there is a unique robust equilibrium.
In either case, the applicant pool of college 1 is independent of what college 2 does. For
when the application signal is noiseless, just the top students apply to college 1. And
16As in consumer theory, complementarity may emerge with three or more goods available. With
ranked colleges 1, 2, and 3, college 3 may be harmed by tougher admissions at college 1, if this encourages
enough applications at college 2.
13Σ1
Σ2
 1
 2
E0
Σ1
Σ2
 1  2
E0
E1
E2
Figure 4: College Responses and Equilibria. In both panels, the functions 1 (solid)
and 2 (dashed) give pairs of thresholds so that colleges 1 and 2 ll their capacities in equilib-
rium. The left panel depicts a unique robust stable equilibrium, while the right panel shows a
case with multiple robust equilibria. E0 and E2 are stable, while E1 is unstable.
when applications are free, all students apply to college 1, and will enroll if accepted.
With application costs and noise, 1 is upward-sloping, as application pools depend
on both college thresholds. When college 2 adjusts its admission standard, the student
incentives to gamble on college 1 are aected. This feedback is critical in our paper. It
leads to a richer interaction among the colleges, and perhaps to multiple robust equilibria.
In Figure 4, left panel, 1 is steeper than 2 at the crossing point. Let us call any
such robust equilibrium stable. It is stable in the following sense: Suppose that whenever
enrollment falls below capacity, the college eases its admission standards, and vice versa.
Then this dynamic adjustment process pushes us back towards the equilibrium. Then
at this theoretical level, admission thresholds act as prices in a Walrasian tatonnement.
Unstable robust equilibria should be rare: They require that a college's enrollment
responds more to the other school's admission standard than its own.
Theorem 2 (Existence) A robust stable equilibrium exists. College 1 lls its capacity.
Also, there exists  1(2;c) < 1 2 satisfying limc!0  1(2;c) = 1 2 such that if 1 
 1(2;c), then college 2 also lls its capacity in any robust equilibrium. If 1 >  1(2;c),
then college 2 has excess capacity in some robust equilibrium.
Surprisingly, college 2 may have excess capacity in equilibrium, despite excess demand
for college slots.17 This possibility is a consequence of portfolio eects: if college 1 is
suciently big its standards may be low enough that college 2 fails to attract enough
17 College 1 cannot have excess capacity in a robust equilibrium. For then it must set the lowest pos-
sible standards, whereupon all students would apply and be accepted, violating its capacity constraint.
14applicants to ll its capacity even if it accepts all of them. In this case, 2 = 1 for all
students, and so the acceptance function traverses the top side of the unit square in
Figure 3. So as student caliber rises, the lowest students apply to college f2g, higher
students to both colleges, and the best students just apply to college f1g. Let us observe
in passing that this is a robust sorting equilibrium.
Since admissions standards are strategic complements, multiple robust equilibria are
possible (right panel of Figure 4).18 In such a scenario, both colleges raise their standards,
yet students send even more applications, and another robust equilibrium arises.
4.2 Comparative Statics
We now continue to explore the supply and demand metaphor, and derive some basic
comparative statics. The potential multiplicity of robust equilibria makes a comparative
statics exercise dicult. But fortunately, our analysis applies to all robust stable sorting
equilibria and in some cases to all robust stable equilibria. Indeed, at any robust stable
equilibrium, greater capacity at either college lowers both college admissions thresholds.
This result speaks to the equilibrium eects at play. Greater capacity at one school,
or an exogenous increase in the \supply" of slots at that college, reduces the \price"
(admission standard) at both schools. The left panel of Figure 5 proves this assertion
for an increase in 2, and the proof for a change in 1 is analogous.
For intuition, consider a robust stable sorting equilibrium, where students apply as
in Figure 3. Let college 2 raise its capacity 2. For any admission standard  1, this
depresses  2, so 2 shifts down. Then the marginal student that was indierent between
applying to college 2 only (C2) and both colleges (B) now prefers to apply to college 2
only. So fewer apply to college 1. Given this portfolio shift, college 1 drops its admission
standards, and both thresholds are lower in the new equilibrium E1. The same logic
generates the analogous comparative static for an increase in capacity at college 1.
Unlike college capacity, changes in college payos or application costs aect both best
response functions 1 and 2. As a result, the comparative statics can be ambiguous,
and counter-intuitive results may emerge. For example, suppose the payo v of college 1
rises (right panel of Figure 5). At the current admissions standards, demand for college
1 will increase, while demand for college 2 decreases as more of its applicants gamble up
on college 1. These forces lead to new best response functions, namely a rightward shift
18The online appendix contains a solved example with multiplicity.
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Figure 5: Comparative Statics. In both panels, the best response functions 1 (solid)
and 2 (dashed) are drawn. The left panel considers a rise in 2, which shifts 2 up and has
no eect on 1. In the right panel, we illustrate the eect of an increase in college 1's payo,
which shifts 1 to the right and shifts 2 down.
in 1 and a downward shift in 2.
At rst glance, this has ambiguous eects: depending on the size of the shifts, both
admissions standards could rise or both could fall, or the standard at college 1 could
rise and that of college 2 could fall.19 But provided 2 does not fall below the point
A in Figure 5, the new curves 0
1 and 0
2 will cross above and to the right of A. In
that case, there is another robust and stable equilibrium in which  1 rises. Notice that
college 2 attracts more applications and admits more students at A than at E0 because
of its lower standards, while losing joint admits at the same rate as before (see the proof
of Theorem 3). So it must have excess demand at A, and thus 0
2 must pass between
E0 and A, implying a new equilibrium E1 in which college 1's standards increase.
Next, assume that the application cost c rises, perhaps due to a rise in the SAT or
ACT cost, or the common application fee. This has two eects. On the one hand, it
decreases the number of college applications (the region B in Figure 3 shrinks). This
has an unambiguously negative eect on demand at both colleges. On the other hand, it
decreases competition between the colleges, as there will be fewer overlapping applica-
tions. This has no eect on college 1 (since they always beat college 2 for joint admits),
but it improves the yield of college 2. As a result, demand at college 1 falls and 1 shifts
left, but the eect on 2 is ambiguous.
Using an argument similar to the one above, we can show that there exists a new
robust stable equilibrium in which  1 falls. But due to the competition eect, we cannot
19We face the same ambiguity in analyzing the eect of an increase in the payo u of college 2.
16be sure how  2 moves: college 2 may raise its standards in the new equilibrium, if the
higher applications costs deter suciently many students from gambling up.
Consider instead a rise in just one college's application cost, such as a college requiring
a longer essay or imposing a greater fee. We argue that in a robust stable sorting
equilibrium, if the application cost at either college slightly falls, then the admission
standard at college 1 rises and its student caliber distribution stochastically worsens.
For example, if the application cost at college 2 falls, then more students apply,
and it is forced to raise its standards. The marginal benet of a stretch application to
college 1 thus rises. To counter this, college 1 responds with a higher standard. Still,
its set of applicants is of lower caliber than before (in the sense of the strong set order),
and though it screens them more tightly, its caliber distribution stochastically worsens.
By contrast, college 2 loses not only its worst students, but also top ones for whom it
was insurance, and its caliber change is ambiguous.
Summarizing our results on changes in college payos and application costs:
Theorem 3 (Comparative Statics) In a robust stable sorting equilibrium:
(a) When v increases, there exists another robust equilibrium in which  1 increases.
(b) When c increases, there exists another robust equilibrium in which  1 decreases.
(c) When either college's application cost increases marginally,  1 decreases.
Whenever  1 decreases due to one of the above changes, the distribution of enrolled
calibers at college 1 improves in the sense of rst order stochastic dominance.
The nal part of the theorem suggests that top-tier colleges have an incentive to
increase application costs, since this leads the weakest applicants to self-select out of
applying to them. There is some evidence of this: many top-tier colleges require id-
iosyncratic essays as part of their application, eectively raising application costs.20 Yet
this result relies on our assumption that students know their type and colleges do not,
for if colleges were better than students at identifying caliber, then they might want to
encourage applications by lowering application costs. This appears to be true for low-
income students: Hoxby and Avery (2012) show that many low-income high-achievers
act as if they were unaware of their caliber, and do not apply to any selective colleges.
In this case top schools should decrease frictions for low-income students, through appli-
cation cost waivers and targeted recruiting eorts | both of which we see in practice.
20For example, one essay prompt from the University of Chicago this year is the Winston Churchill
quote that \A joke is a very serious thing"; also, almost all of Amherst's essay prompts are based on
quotes from Amherst professors and alumni.
17The logic underlying this section does not essentially depend on the assumption that
there are two colleges. For instance, whenever colleges have overlapping applicant pools,
a rise in capacity at any one college depresses the admission standards at all of them.
Consider the positive theory of this section in light of Hoxby (2009). She shows that
during 1962-2007, the median college has become signicantly less selective, while at
the same time, admissions have become more competitive at the top 10% of colleges.
Her explanation for the fall in standards hinges on capacity: the number of freshman
places per high-school graduate has been rising steadily. But as we illustrate in Figure 5,
higher capacity at all schools should depress standards at all schools, via our spillover
eect. As a countervailing force, she argues that students have simultaneously become
more willing to enroll far from home, raising the relative payo of selective colleges. This
aligns with Theorem 3: starting at a robust and stable sorting equilibrium, a perceived
increase in the value of an education at a top school leads it to raise its standards.
5 Do Colleges and Students Sort in Equilibrium?
Casual empiricism suggests that the best students apply to the best colleges, and those
colleges are in turn the most selective. This logic justies ranking colleges based on their
admissions standards. Curiously, these claims are false without stronger assumptions.
We identify and explore two possible types of sorting violations.
The rst violation occurs when some relatively high calibers \play it safe". By
Corollary 1, along the acceptance function, higher types enjoy a higher ratio of ad-
missions chances at college 1 to college 2. But this does not imply a higher marginal
benet 1(1   2u) of applying to college 1, and so lower types may apply more ag-
gressively. We illustrate this in the left panel of Figure 6, where application sets are
;f2g;f1;2g;f2g;f1;2g;f1g as caliber rises. A concrete example is the Texas top 10%
plan, which guarantees automatic admission to any school in the UT system for students
graduating in the top 10% of their high-school class. Such students have little incentive
to apply to slightly better out-of-state schools (college 1), since the payo increment is
small and they don't need the insurance of a second application. But students who just
miss the 10% cuto may want the insurance, and so one might see more aggressive ap-
plication portfolios from those (lower-caliber) students, generating a non-monotonicity.
The second violation occurs when the worse college sets a higher admissions stan-
dard. To see how this can happen, consider the edge case where the standards are the
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Figure 6: Non-Monotone Behavior. In the left panel, the signal structure induces a
piecewise linear acceptance function. Student behavior is non-monotone, since there are both
low and high caliber students who apply to college 2 only (C2), while intermediate ones insure
by applying to both. In the right panel, equal thresholds at both colleges induce an acceptance
function along the diagonal, 1 = 2. Student behavior is non-monotone, as both low and
high caliber students apply to college 1 only (C1), while middling caliber students apply to
both. Such an acceptance function also arises when caliber signals are very noisy.
same at both colleges. With common admissions chances , the marginal benet of
a safety application (1   )u is not increasing in  (and thus not in caliber, either).
The right panel of Figure 6 depicts one such case | where the application sets are
;f1g;f1;2g;f1g as caliber rises.In this case college 2 only attracts insurance applica-
tions. This can be an equilibrium outcome if college 2 is small enough (and by making
it still smaller, college 2 can end up setting a higher standard than college 1).
To rule out the rst sorting violation, it suces that college 2 oer a low payo
(u < 0:5), so that the payo increment of admission to college 1 is large. We show in the
Appendix that this ensures that the marginal benet of additionally applying to college
is increasing in caliber. The second sort of violation cannot occur when college 1 sets
a suciently higher admission standard than college 2. This happens when college 1
is suciently smaller than college 2. The threshold capacity will depend on the model
primitives: rival capacity, applications cost, payo dierential and signal structure.
Theorem 4 (Non-Sorting and Sorting in Equilibrium)
(a) If college 2 is \too good" (i.e., u > 0:5), then there exists a continuous MLRP density
g(jx) that yields a robust stable equilibrium with non-monotone student behavior.
(b) If college 2 is small enough relative to college 1, then college 2 sets a higher admissions
19standard than college 1 in some robust equilibrium.
(c) If college 1 is small enough relative to college 2, and college 2 is not too good (namely,
u  0:5), then there are only robust sorting equilibria and no college has excess capacity.
The challenge in proving this theorem is to show that all of non-monotone behavior
outlined above can happen in equilibrium. For part (a), we construct a robust non-
monotone equilibrium by starting with the acceptance function depicted in the left panel
of Figure 6, which constrains the relationships between admissions chances across colleges
to be some mapping 2(x) = h(1(x)). We then construct a particular acceptance
chance 1(x) so that the induced student behavior and acceptance rates given (1;h(1))
equate college capacities and enrollments. Finally, we show that these two mappings
satisfy the requirements of Theorem 1 and therefore can be generated by MLRP signals
and monotone standards. For part (b), we show that that by perturbing a robust
equilibrium with equal admissions chances by making college 2 smaller, we get a robust
equilibrium with non-monotone standards. Finally, part (c) turns on showing that when
1 is relatively small, the crossing of the best-response functions must occur at a point
where college 1 sets high enough standards that low caliber students don't apply there.
All told, parts (a) and (b) show that sorting may fail, which is surprising given
how well behaved the signal structure is. Even in equilibrium, the optimal student
portfolio may not increase with caliber; and worse colleges can enroll students of higher
average caliber if they are suciently small.21 Since organizations like US News and
World Report use statistics like the average SAT score of matriculants in their college
rankings, this undercuts how colleges are ranked.
For an insightful counterpoint, consider what happens when students are limited
to just a single application, as it is sometimes the case.22 Recalling the left panel in
Figure 2, we see that the diagonal line 1u = 2, and the individual rational equalities
2u = 1 = c, jointly partition the application space into three relevant parts. But
with any acceptance function with the falling secant property, low types apply nowhere,
middle types apply to college 2, and high types apply to college 1. It should come as
21This can be illustrated using the right panel of Figure 6. Consider a robust equilibrium with equal
admissions standards at the two colleges. If f(x) concentrates most of its mass on the interval of low
calibers who apply just to college 1, then the average caliber of students enrolled at college 1 will be
strictly smaller than that at college 2. This example can be adjusted slightly so that college 2 is more
selective than college 1. (See our online appendix for a eshed out example of this phenomenon.)
22In Britain, all college applications go through UCAS, a centralized clearing house. A maximum of
ve applications is allowed.
20no surprise that there is a unique robust equilibrium. So it turns out that the sorting
failures in Theorem 4 (a) and (b) require portfolio applications.
Moreover, the college non-monotonicity result requires that colleges have some \mar-
ket power". To see this, suppose that there were instead two tiers of colleges, a top tier 1
and an lesser tier 2; each containing a continuum of otherwise identical colleges with
total capacity 1 and 2 respectively. Students may apply to multiple colleges within a
tier, each application generating a conditionally iid signal and costing c. Then college
standards must be monotone; for if the top tier colleges were easier to get into, no student
would ever apply to a second tier college. By contrast, we show in the online appendix
that the student non-monotonicity result is robust to making the colleges atomistic.
6 General Incomplete Information About Calibers
A. When Students Do Not Know their Calibers. We have assumed that colleges
observe conditionally independent evaluations of the students' true calibers. At the
opposite extreme, one might envision a hypothetical world where colleges know student
calibers, and students see noisy conditionally independent signals of them. Yet observe
that this is informationally equivalent to a world in which students know their calibers,
and colleges observe perfectly correlated signals. For any student sees a signal equal to
t + \noise", while both colleges see the student caliber t.
This embedding suggests that we could capture the world in which students and
colleges alike only see noisy conditionally iid signals of calibers by relabeling the student
signal as their caliber. We argue in the appendix that under this relabeling that world
is a special case of the following one:
(F) Students know their calibers and colleges observe aliated noisy signals of them.
Thus, we can without loss of generality assume that students know their calibers and
colleges vary by their signal aliation.23 Observe that in this world, Theorem 1 remains
a valid description of how the unconditional acceptance chances at the two colleges relate.
B. Perfectly Correlated Signals. This benchmark is highly instructive. Suppose
rst that the two colleges observe perfectly correlated signals of student calibers. As
we mentioned above, this is akin to observing the caliber of each applicant. The key
(counterfactual) feature here is that if a student is accepted by the more selective college,
23Some predictions outside of the model might dier in the known and unknown calibers cases.
21then so is he at the less selective one. This immediately implies that  1 >  2 in
equilibrium, for otherwise no one would apply to college 2. So contrary to Theorem 4,
college behavior must be monotone in any equilibrium.
The analysis of this case diers in a few dimensions from x3.1. Since  1 >  2,
applying to both colleges now yields payo 1 + (2   1)u   2c. Unlike before,24
MB21  (2   1)u = c and MB12  1(1   u) = c (8)
because admission to college 1 guarantees admission to college 2. In this informational
world, both optimality equations are linear, and the latter is vertical (see Figure 7).
Assume that college 1 is suciently more selective than college 2. Then the lowest
caliber applicants apply to college 2 | namely, those whose admission chance exceeds
c=u. Students so good that their admission chance at college 1 is at least c=(1   u) add
a stretch application, provided college 2 admits them with chance c=u(1   u) or more.
In Figure 7, this occurs when the acceptance function crosses above the intersection
point of the curves MB21 = c and MB12 = c.25 Since the marginal benet MB12 is
independent of the admission chance at college 2, MB12 > c for all higher calibers.
But monotone behavior for stronger caliber students requires another assumption.
Consider the margin between applying just to college 1, or adding a safety application.
The top caliber students will apply to college 1 only, since their admission chance is so
high. But the behavior of slightly lesser student calibers is trickier, as the acceptance
function can multiply cross the line MB21 = c.26 Under slightly stronger assumptions,
the acceptance function is concave; this precludes such perverse multiple-crossings, and
implies monotone student behavior.27
Consider now the possibility of non-monotone student behavior. Absent a concave
acceptance function, the previous sorting failure owing to multiple-crossings arises. But
even with a concave acceptance function, a sorting failure arises if college 1 is not su-
ciently choosier than college 2. For then a suitably drawn concave acceptance function
could consecutively hit regions C1, B, then C1, and a sorting failure ensues.
Having explored the impact of correlation on college-student sorting, we now esh
24We suppress the caliber x argument of the unconditional acceptance chance i(x) at college i = 1;2.
25Namely, at the mutual intersection of regions C1;C2, and B in Figure 7. By inequality (13), this
holds under our hypothesis that college 1 is suciently choosier than college 2.
26For as seen in Figure 7, that line also has a strictly falling secant.
27Concavity holds whenever  Gx(jx) is log-supermodular. This is true when we further restrict to
location families (like the Normal) or scale families (such as exponential).
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Figure 7: Student Behavior with Perfectly Correlated Signals. The shaded regions
depict the optimal portfolio choices for students when colleges observe perfectly correlated
signals. Unlike Figure 2, the MB12 = c curve separating regions B and C2 is vertical. The 1
curve at the right is vertical (up to a point), since college 2 no longer imposes an externality
on college 1 when the set of calibers sending multiple applications is nonempty.
out its eect on college feedbacks. Since MB12 is independent of the admission threshold
at college 2 in (8), the pool of applicants to college 1 is unaected by changes in  2.
Hence, the 1 locus is vertical over most of its domain.28 The better college is insulated
from the decisions of its weaker rival, and the setting is not as rich as our baseline
conditionally iid case. It is obvious from Figure 7 that the robust equilibrium is unique.
C. Aliated College Evaluations. We now turn to the general case of assumption
(F). Each student knows his caliber x, and colleges see signals 1;2 of them, with an
aliated joint density g(1;2jx).29 Since acceptance and rejection by college 1 is good
and bad news, respectively, it intuitively follows that

A
2  2  
R
2 (9)
Here, A
2 and R
2 are the respective acceptance chances at college 2 given acceptance
and rejection at college 1. For instance, 1 = A
2 > 2 > R
2 with perfectly correlation.
But in the conditionally iid case, college 2 is unaected by the decision of college 1, and
28The locus 1 vertical if college 1 is suciently more selective than college 2. For then the acceptance
function is high enough that it traverses region B, and some students send multiple applications. If not,
then the acceptance function could hit C2 and then C1, bipassing region B. In that case, the marginal
applicant to college 1 depends on  2, and hence 1 is not vertical.
29As is standard, this means that g obeys the monotone likelihood ratio property for every xed x.
23so A
2 = 2 = R
2 . Since these are intuitively opposite ends of an aliation spectrum,
we call evaluations more aliated if the conditional acceptance chance A
2 at college 2
is higher for any given unconditional acceptance chance 2.
Let's rst see how aliation aects student applications. In this more general setting,
MB21 = (1   1)
R
2 u and MB12 = 1(1   
A
2 u): (10)
This subsumes the marginal analysis for our conditionally iid and perfectly correlated
cases: (1){(2) and (8). Relative to these benchmarks, the acceptance curse (or the
\acceptance blessing") conferred by college 1's two possible decisions lessens the marginal
gain of an extra application to either college | due to inequality (9). More intuitively,
double admission is more likely when signals are more aliated. In our graph, this is
reected by a right shift of the curve MB12 = c, and a left shift of MB21 = c. In other
words, for any given college admission standards, students send both fewer stretch and
safety applications when college evaluations are more aliated.
We next explore how aliated evaluations aects college behavior. Consider the best
reply locus 1 of college 1. It is upward-sloping with conditionally iid college evaluations,
and vertical with perfectly correlated evaluations. We argue that it is upward-sloping
with aliated evaluations, and grows steeper as evaluations grow more aliated. In
other words, our benchmark conditionally iid case delivers robust results about two-way
college feedbacks. Perfectly correlated evaluations therefore ignores the eect of the lesser
on the better college, and so is less reective of the aliated case.
We rst show that the best response curve 1 slopes upward with imperfect alia-
tion. For let college 1's admission standard  1 rise. Then its unconditional acceptance
chance 1 falls for every student. The marginal student pondering a stretch applica-
tion must then fall in order for college 1 to ll its capacity (6). Optimality MB12 = c
in (10) next requires that this student's conditional acceptance chance A
2 fall. This only
happens if his unconditional chance 2 falls too | i.e. the standard  2 rises.
Next, college 1's best response curve 1 slopes up more steeply when college eval-
uations are more strongly aliated. For as aliation rises, the marginal student sees
a greater fall in his admission chance A
2 . So his unconditional chance 2 falls more
too, and college 2's admission standard  2 drops more than before (see Figure 7), as
claimed. As an aside, since robust equilibrium is unique with perfectly correlated college
evaluations, uniqueness intuitively holds more often when we are closer to this extreme.
Finally, we consider how the equilibrium sorting result Theorem 4 changes with ali-
24ation. By examining (10), we see that as we transition from conditionally iid to perfectly
correlated signals with increasing aliation, the region of multiple applications shrinks
monotonically. This simple insight has important implications for sorting behavior. By
standard continuity logic, for very low or high aliation, sorting obtains and fails ex-
actly as in the respective conditional independent or perfectly correlated cases. More
strongly, the negative result in Theorem 4 (b) fails for moderately high aliation: For
then nonmonotone college behavior is impossible since the locus MB21 = c in (8) lies
strictly above the diagonal, and thus the same holds for (10) with suciently aliated
signals. So the acceptance function would lie below the diagonal if admission standards
were inverted, and no student would ever apply to college 2. Lastly, the logic for the
positive sorting result of Theorem 4 (c) is still valid: both student and college behav-
ior are monotone if college 2 is not too small and not too good, and if the acceptance
function is concave | appealing to the logic for perfectly correlated signals.
7 The Spillover Eects of Armative Action
We now explore the eects of an armative action policy.30 Slightly enriching our
model, we rst assume that a fraction  of the applicant pool belongs to a target group.
This may be an under-represented minority, but it may also be a majority group. For
instance, many states favor their own students at state colleges | Wisconsin public
colleges can have at most 25% out-of-state students. Just as well, some colleges strongly
value athletes or students from low-income backgrounds. We assume a common caliber
distribution, so that there is no other reason for dierential treatment of the applicants.
Assume that students honestly report their \target group" status on their applica-
tions. Reecting the colleges' desire for a more diverse student body, let college i earn a
bonus i  0 for each enrolled target student. Colleges may set dierent thresholds for
the two groups. If college i oer a \discount" i to target applicants, then the respective
standards for non-target and target groups are ( 1; 2) and ( 1 1; 2 2). Akin to
third degree price discrimination, now colleges equate the shadow cost of capacity across
groups for the marginally admitted student. So at each college, the expected payo of
the marginal admits from the two groups should coincide | except at a corner solution,
when a college admits all students from a group. This yields two new equilibrium condi-
30For recent treatment of complementary armative action issues, see Epple, Romano, and Sieg
(2008), Hickman (2010), Groen and White (2004), and Curs and Singell (2002).
25tions that account for the fact that ex post, colleges behave rationally, and equate their
expected values of target and non-target applicants. Along with college market clearing
(6), equilibrium entails solving four equations in four unknowns.
The analysis is simpler if we assume private values, and we begin with this case.
Since colleges care directly about the signal observed with private values, equalization
of the marginal admits of the two groups i = 1;2 reduces to  i =  i   i + i, and so
i = i. That is, the `discount' aorded to a student from the target group equals the
additional payo a college enjoys from admitting a student from the target versus the
non-target group. Thus, college preferences for target group students translate directly
into admission standard discounts for that group.
Instead, with common values the equalization of shadow values (i.e., the expected
payo of the marginal admits from the two groups) yields the richer conditions:
E[X + 1j =  1   1;target] = E[Xj 1;non-target]
E[X + 2j =  2   2;target, accepts] = E[Xj 2;non-target, accepts]
Here, X is the student caliber. As before, along with (6), equilibrium amounts to
solving four equations in four unknowns. Notice that no longer do we have i = i,
which signicantly complicates the analysis of the problem. Rather, the discount i
now depends on i in a nonlinear fashion via the conditional expectations. To obtain a
sharp result, we impose the following notion of stability, which we explain in the online
appendix: when the shadow value of a target student exceeds that of a non-target
student, college i responds by raising the target advantage i. Call the equilibrium
shadow value stable if this dynamic adjustment process pushes us back to the equilibrium.
Theorem 5 (Armative Action) Fix 1 = 2 = 0.
(a) Assume private values and a robust stable equilibrium. As the preference for
a target group at one college rises, it favors those students and penalizes non-target
students, with no eect on the other college. As the preference  for target students at
both colleges rises from 1 = 2 =  = 0, both favor them and penalize non-target ones.
(b) Assume that 1 = 2 = 0 is a robust shadow value stable equilibrium with
monotone student behavior.31 As the preference for a target group at college 1 rises, it
favors those students and college 2 penalizes them. As the preference for target students
at college 2 rises, both colleges favor them more.
31Such an equilibrium easily exists when c = 0, and by continuity for c small enough.
26Observe the indirect eect of student preferences: Nontarget students face stier admis-
sion standards since the shadow value of capacity is now higher. The assumption that
1 = 2 = 0 is important, as it precludes some complex feedback eects that emerge
when there is already a preference for target students at the outset.
Consider private values. For a sharper insight, let the signal distribution be G( x)
(location family). Suppose that both colleges exhibit identical preference  for the target
group. Since  =  for both colleges, the acceptance relation is identical for both groups
and given by  (1) = 1   G( 2    1 + G 1(1   1)) (the discounts cancel out in the
argument of G for the target group). This implies that caliber x from the target group
applies exactly as if they were a type x+ from the non-target group: a testable claim.
If instead only one college, say 1, has a preference 1 for the target group, then it
sets a discount 1 = 1. The acceptance relation for the target group is then  (2) =
1   G( 2    1 + 1 + G 1(1   1)), which is everywhere below that of the non-target
group  (2) = 1 G( 2  1+G 1(1 1)). As a result, in a robust sorting equilibrium,
target-group students will gamble up and apply to college 1 more often, and insure with
an application to college 2 less often, than non-target group students.
Regarding common values, Theorem 5 (b) (proof in the online appendix) asserts
that as the preference for a target group at college 1 rises from the no preference case
1 = 2 = 0, it favors those target students, but now college 2 instead penalizes them.
But when the preference for target students at the worse college 2 rises, both favor them.
In other words, an asymmetry emerges under common values. When only college 1
favors a target group of students, college 2 must counter this with a penalty, owing to
two eects. First, the best favored students that previously applied to college 2 now
just apply to college 1, and thus the pool of target applicants at college 2 worsens. This
portfolio eect was present with private values. Second, college 2 confronts an acceptance
curse. A student who enrolls there either only applied to it, or also applied to college 1
| and was rejected. So the event that a student enrolls at college 2 is a worse signal of
his caliber if college 1 has favored them.32
32This asymmetric result should speak to studies, like Kane (1998), that found that armative action
for disadvantaged minorities is generally conned to selective schools | as we think of college 1.
278 Concluding Remarks
We have formulated the college admissions problem for two ranked colleges with xed
capacities in order to study the eects of two frictions in equilibrium. Student types
are heterogeneous and colleges only partially observe their types. College applications
are costly, and students therefore face a nontrivial portfolio choice. This model admits
a tractable separable solution in stages | student portfolios reect the admission stan-
dards, and colleges then compete as if they were Bertrand duopolists. This framework
is the only equilibrium model that speaks to the recent empirical explorations of stu-
dent application behavior (Avery and Kane (2004); Pallais (2009); Carrell and Sacerdote
(2012); Hoxby and Avery (2012)).
We have characterized in a testable fashion how student admission chances co-move as
their calibers improve, showing how their optimal portfolio choices over stretch and safety
schools dier. We have have discovered that even in this highly monotone matching
world, sorting of students and colleges fails absent stronger assumptions. For better
students need not always apply more aggressively: If the worse college is either too good
or too small, or the application process is noisy enough, one student may gamble on the
better college while a more talented one does not. Likewise, college admissions standards
need not reect their quality | the worse college may optimally impose higher standards
if it is small enough. Large public schools might well be punished in college rankings
publications that use SAT scores of enrolled students in ranking schools.33
Turning to armative action, we predict that favored minority applicants apply as
ambitiously as if they were majority applicants of higher caliber. Card and Krueger
(2005) investigate what happened when armative action was eliminated at state schools
in California and Texas. They nd a small but statistically signicant drop in the
probability that minority applicants send their SAT scores to elite state schools, but
nd no such eect for highly qualied minority applicants (those with high SATs or
GPAs). This is consistent with our nding that lower caliber minority applicants send
stretch applications under armative action.
While the two college world is restrictive, it is the most parsimonious model with
portfolio eects, stretch and safety schools, and admission standards set by competing
33 Avery, Glickman, Hoxby, and Metrick (2004) develop an innovative revealed preference college
ranking based on enrollment decisions by students admitted at multiple schools, and public schools
are indeed ranked higher under their approach. One diculty for them is that the initial application
portfolios are endogenous. Explicitly modeling the application decision using our model of portfolio
choice | as in Fu (2010) | may be helpful in resolving the econometric inference problems that result.
28schools. The portfolio eects induce important and realistic interdependencies missing
from all frictionless models of student-college matching. Since assortative matching can
fail in this setting, it can fail more generally. Our baseline model has assumed that
students perfectly know their calibers and colleges only observe them with noise, but we
have argued that the portfolio eects and sorting failures monotonically diminish as we
shift toward the opposite extreme when colleges have superior information. And even
in this limit, students send stretch and safety applications, and sorting can fail.
A Appendix: Omitted Proofs
A.1 Colleges Optimally Employ Admissions Thresholds
Let i() be the expected value of the student's caliber given that he applies to college i,
his signal is , and he accepts. College i optimally employs a threshold rule if, and only
if, i() increases in . For college 1 this is immediate, since g(jx) enjoys the MLRP
property. College 2 faces an acceptance curse, and so 2() is:
2() =
R
C2 xg(jx)f(x)dx +
R
B xG( 1jx)g(jx)f(x)dx
R
C2 g(jx)f(x)dx +
R
B G( 1jx)g(jx)f(x)dx
(11)
where we denote by C2 the set of calibers applying to 2 only, and B those applying to
both.34 Write (11) as 2() =
R
B[C2 xh2(xj)dx using indicator function notation:
h2(xj) =
(IC2(x) + IBG( 1jx))g(jx)f(x) R
B[C2(IC2(t) + IBG( 1jt))g(jt)f(t)dt
; (12)
Then the `density' h2(xj) has the MLRP. Therefore, 2() increases in .
Notice that the same results obtain for any increasing function i() | in particular,
if it is the identity function, as in the private values case. 
A.2 Simultaneous versus Sequential Timing
We claim the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) outcomes of the two-stage game when
students move rst coincide with the Nash equilibria of the simultaneous-move game.
34 We assume that students employ pure strategies, which follows from our analysis of the student
optimization in x3.1. Measurability of sets B and C2 owe to the continuity of our functions i(x) in x3.2.
29First, consider an SPE of the two-stage game where students choose applications S =
S() and then colleges choose standards  1(S) and  2(S). Colleges best respond to each
other given the realized S. As students are non atomic, they treat S as xed in the rst-
stage, and so their applications best respond to the anticipated standards 
1 =  1(S)
and 
2 =  2(S). This is a Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous move game.
Conversely, since each student has measure zero, he cannot aect the college stan-
dards by adjusting his application strategy. Hence, any equilibrium (S;
1;
2) of the
simultaneous move game is also an SPE outcome of the two-stage game. 
A.3 Acceptance Function Shape: Proof of Theorem 1
To avoid duplication, we assume  1 >  2 throughout the proof.
()) The Acceptance Function has the Double Secant Property. First,
since G( 1jx) is continuously dierentiable in x, the acceptance function is continuously
dierentiable on (0;1]. Given   1   G(j(;)), partial derivatives have positive
slopes ; > 0. Dierentiating (3),
@ 
@1 =  Gx( 2j(1; 1))(1; 1) > 0
@ 
@ 1 =  Gx( 2j(1; 1))(1; 1) > 0
@ 
@ 2 =  g( 2j(1; 1)) < 0:
(13)
Properties of the cdf G imply  (0; 1; 2)  0 and  (1; 1; 2) = 1. The limits of   as
thresholds approach the supremum and inmum owe to limit properties of G.
Now, G(jx) and 1   G(jx) are strictly log-supermodular in (;x) since the den-
sity g(jx) obeys the strict MLRP. Since x = (1; 1) is strictly increasing in 1,
G(sj(1; 1)) and 1   G(sj(1; 1)) are then strictly log-supermodular in (s;1). So
the secant slopes below strictly fall in 1, since  1 >  2:
 (1)
1
=
1   G( 2j(1))
1   G( 1j(1))
and
1    (1)
1   1
=
G( 2j(1))
G( 1j(1))
:
(() Deriving a Signal Distribution. Conversely, x a function h with the
double secant property and a smoothly monotone onto function 1(x). Also, put 2(x) =
h(1(x)), so that 2(x) > 1(x). We must nd a continuous signal density g(jx) with
the strict MLRP and thresholds 1 > 2 that rationalize the h as the acceptance function
consistent with these thresholds and signal distribution.
30Step 1: A Discrete Signal Distribution. Consider a discrete distribution with
realizations in f 1;0;1g: g1(x) = 1(x), g0(x) = 2(x) 1(x) and g 1(x) = 1 2(x).
Indeed, for each caliber x, gi  0 and sum to 1. This obeys the strict MLRP because
g0(x)
g1(x)
=
2(x)   1(x)
1(x)
=
h(1(x))
1(x)
  1;
is strictly decreasing by the rst secant property of h, and
g0(x)
g 1(x)
=
2(x)   1(x)
1   2(x)
=  1 +
1   1(x)
1   h(1(x))
is strictly increasing in x by the second secant property of h.
Let the college thresholds be ( 1; 2) = (0:5; 0:5). Then G( 1jx) = g 1(x) +
g0(x) = 1   1(x) and G( 2jx) = g 1(x) = 1   2(x). Rearranging yields 1(x) =
1   G( 1jx) and 2(x) = 1   G( 2jx). Inverting 1(x) and recalling that 2 = h(1),
we obtain 2 = h(1) = 1   G( 2j( 1;1)), thereby showing that h is the acceptance
function consistent with this signal distribution and thresholds.
Step 2: A Continuous Signal Density. To create an atomless signal distri-
bution, we smooth the atoms using a carefully chosen kernel function. Dene g(jx) =
P
i=f 1;0;1g gi(x)k(x; i) and let k(x;s) = 1(jsj < 0:5)(1 + 2sw(x)), where the weight-
ing function w(x) has range [0;1]. The transformation is mass-preserving since as w(x)
transfers mass to a point s > 0 it removes the corresponding mass from  s. The weight-
ing function determines the shape of the smoothing, so we now nd conditions on w(x)
such that the strict MLRP holds. Consider 0 < 1 2 ( 1:5;1:5), and suppose rst that
they are both close to the same atom i in that jj   ij < 0:5 for j = 0;1. Then
g(1jx)
g(0jx)
=
gi(x)(1 + 2(1   i)w(x))
gi(x)(1 + 2(0   i)w(x))
=
1 + 2(1   i)w(x)
1 + 2(0   i)w(x)
which will be strictly increasing in x if w(x) is a strictly increasing function. Imposing
this restriction on w(x), if they inherit mass from points i < j, we have
g(1jx)
g(0jx)
=
gk(x)(1 + 2(1   k)w(x))
gi(x)(1 + 2(0   i)w(x))
A sucient condition for this to be strictly increasing in x almost everywhere is that it
is weakly increasing when 1   k =  0:5 and 0   i = 0:5 (i.e.
gk(x)
gi(x)
(1 w(x))
(1+w(x)) increasing
318k > i 8x). Since
gk(x)
gi(x) is strictly increasing, choosing a strictly increasing w(x) with
appropriately bounded derivatives achieves this. 
A.4 Monotone Student Strategies
Claim 1 Student behavior is monotone in caliber if (a) college 2 has payo u  0:5,
and (b) college 2 imposes a low enough admissions standard relative to college 1.
By part (a), if a student applies to college 1, then any better student does too. By
part (b), if a student applies to college 2, then any worse student applies there or nowhere.
The proof proceeds as follows. We rst show that (i) u  0:5 implies that if a caliber
applies to college 1, then any higher caliber applies as well. Second, we (ii) produce a
sucient condition that ensures that the admissions threshold at college 2 is suciently
lower than that of college 1, so that if a caliber applies to college 2, then any lower
caliber who applies to college sends an application to college 2, and calibers at the lower
tail apply nowhere. From these two results, monotone student behavior ensues.
Proof of Part (i), Step 1. We rst show that the acceptance function 2 =  (1)
crosses 2 = (1=u)(1   c=1) (i.e., MB12  1(1   2u) = c) only once when u  0:5.
Since (i) the acceptance function starts at 1 = 0 and ends at 1 = 1, (ii) MB12 = c
starts at 1 = c and ends at 1 = c=(1   u), and (iii) both functions are continuous,
there exists a crossing point. And they intersect when 1(1    (1)u) = c.
[(1  (1)u)1]
0= 1 u (1) 1u 
0(1)>1 u (1) u (1)=1 2u (1)1 2u0;
where the rst inequality exploits  (1)=1 falling in 1 (Theorem 1), i.e.  0(1) <
 (1)=1; the next two inequalities use  (1)  1 and u  0:5. Since MB12 is rising in
1 when the acceptance relation hits 2 = (1   c=1)=u, the intersection is unique.
Proof of Part (i), Step 2. We now show that Step 1 implies the following
single crossing property in terms of x: if caliber x applies to college 1 (i.e., if 1 2 S(x),
then any caliber y > x also applies to college 1 (i.e., 1 2 S(y)). Suppose not; i.e.,
assume that either S(y) = ? or S(y) = f2g. If S(y) = ?, then S(x) = ? as well,
as 1(x) < 1(y) and 2(x) < 2(y), contradicting the hypothesis that 1 2 S(x). If
S(y) = f2g, then there are two cases: S(x) = f1g or S(x) = f1;2g. The rst cannot
occur, for by Theorem 1 2(x)=1(x) > 2(y)=1(y), and thus 2(y)u  1(y) implies
2(x)u > 1(x), contradicting S(x) = f1g. In turn, the second case is ruled out by the
32monotonicity of MB12 derived above, as caliber y has greater incentives than x to add
college 1 to its portfolio, and thus S(y) = f2g cannot be optimal.
Proof of Part (ii), Step 1. We rst show that if the acceptance function passes
above the point ( 1;  2) =

u(1  
p
1   4c=u)=2;(1  
p
1   4c=u)=2

| point P in the
right panel of Figure 6 | then there is a unique crossing of the acceptance function and
2 = c=u(1   1), i.e. MB21 = c. Now, the acceptance function passes above ( 1;  2) if
 ( 1; 1; 2)   2: (14)
This condition relates  1 and  2. Rewrite (14) using Theorem 1 as  2  ( 1) <  1,
where  is dened by  ( 1; 1;) =  2. Thus, condition (14) requires a large enough
\wedge" between the standards of the two colleges.
To show that (14) implies a unique crossing, consider the secant of 2 = c=u(1 1)
(the curve MB21 = c). It has an increasing secant if and only if 1  1=2. To see this,
dierentiate 2=1 = c=u1(1   1) in 1. Notice also that MB21 = c intersects the
diagonal 2 = 1 at the points (`
1;`
2) = (1=2 
p
1   4c=u=2;1=2 
p
1   4c=u=2) and
(h
1;h
2) = (1=2 +
p
1   4c=u=2;1=2 +
p
1   4c=u=2) > (1=2;1=2).
Condition (14) gives  (`
1; 1; 2) > `
2. Since  2 <  1, we have  (1; 1; 2)  2
for all 1   1. Thus, the acceptance function crosses MB21 = c at or above (h
1;h
2).
And since h
1 > 1=2, the secant of MB21 = c must be increasing at any intersection with
the acceptance function. Hence, there must be a single crossing point.
Proof of Part (ii), Step 2. We now show that this single crossing property in 
implies another in x: If caliber x applies to college 2 (i.e., if 2 2 S(x)), then any caliber
y < x that applies somewhere also applies to college 2 (i.e., 2 2 S(y) if S(y) 6= ?).
Suppose not; i.e., assume that S(y) = f1g. Then there are two cases: S(x) = f2g or
S(x) = f1;2g. The rst cannot occur, for by Theorem 1 2(x)=1(x) < 2(y)=1(y), and
thus 2(x)u  1(x) implies 2(y)u > 1(y), contradicting S(x) = f2g. The second case
is ruled out by the monotonicity of MB21 given condition (14), as caliber y has greater
incentives than x to apply to college 2, and thus S(y) = f1g cannot be optimal. Finally,
S(y) = ? if 2(y)u < c by (14), which happens for low calibers below a threshold. 
A.5 The Law of Demand
Claim 2 (The Falling Demand Curve) If either college raises its admission stan-
dard, then its enrollment falls, and thus its rival's enrollment rises.
33We only consider the case when  1 rises, since the argument for  2 is similar. Also,
we focus on the nontrivial portfolio eect in each case, since the standards eect of an
increase in  1 is immediate: it lowers enrollment in college 1, and raises it in college 2.
Proof Step 1: The applicant pool at college 1 Shrinks. When  1 rises,
the acceptance relation shifts up by Claim 1, and thus the above type sets change as
well. Fix a caliber x 2 C2 or x 2 , so that 1 = 2 S(x).35 We will show that x continues
to apply either to college 2 only or nowhere, and thus the pool of applicants at college 1
shrinks because 1(x) declines. If x 2 C2, then 2(x)u c  0 and 2(x)u  1(x), and
this continues to hold after the increase in  1, since 1(x) falls while 2(x) is constant.
And if x 2 , then clearly caliber x will continue to apply nowhere when  1 increases.
Proof Step 2: The applicant pool at college 2 expands. It suces to
show that if any caliber x that applies to college 2 at  1 also applies there at a higher  1.
Fix a caliber x 2 C2 or x 2 B, so that 2 2 S(x). If x 2 C2, then 2(x)u   c  0 and
2(x)u  1(x); these inequalities continue to hold after  1 rises, since 1(x) falls while
2(x) remains constant. And if x 2 B, then MB21 = (1   1(x))2(x)u rises in  1,
encouraging caliber x to apply to college 2. So x = 2 C1 [  even after  1 rises. 
A.6 Existence: Proof of Theorem 2
For deniteness, we now denote the inmum (supremum) signal by  1 (1).
Definition of  1(2;c). We will choose the capacity  1 given 2 so that when
college 2 has no standards, both colleges exactly ll their capacity. This borderline
capacity is less than 1   2 since a positive mass of students | perversely, those with
the highest calibers | applies just to college 1, and some are rejected.
Fix any 2 2 (0;1), and let L
1(2) be the unique solution to 2 = E2( 1; 1), i.e.,
when college 2 accepts everybody. (Existence and uniqueness of L
1(2) follows from
E2( 1; 1) = 0, E2(1; 1) = 1, and E2( 1; 1) increasing and continuous in  1.)
Dene the threshold capacity  1(2) = E1(L
1(2); 1).
Limiting Behavior of  1(2;c). Since 2 = E2(L
1(2); 1),  1(2) equals 1 2
minus the mass of students who only applied to, and were rejected by, college 1. This
mass vanishes as c vanishes, for then everybody applies to both colleges. Therefore, the
threshold  1(2) converges to 1   2 as c goes to zero.
35With a slight abuse of notation, we let  denote the set of calibers that apply nowhere. The same
symbol was previously used to denote the analogous set in -space.
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Figure 8: Equilibrium Existence. In the left panel, since 1 >  1(2), the best response
functions 1 and 2 do not intersect, and equilibrium is at E with  2 = 0. The right panel
depicts the proof of Claim 2 for the case 1 <  1(2).
Robust Stable Equilibrium with Excess Capacity. Let 1   1(2). We
claim that there exists a robust stable equilibrium in which college 2 accepts everybody,
and college 1 sets a threshold `
1(1), the unique solution to 1 = E1( 1; 1), which
satises `
1(1)  L
1(2). For since college 2 rejects no one, `
1(1) lls college 1's
capacity exactly. The enrollment at college 2 is then E2(`
1(1); 1)  2 (as `
1(1) 
L
1(2) and E2( 1; 2) is increasing in  1), so by accepting everybody college 2 lls as
much capacity as it can. This robust equilibrium is trivially stable, as 2 is `at' at the
crossing point (see Figure 8, left panel). Moreover, if 1 >  1(2), then college 2 has
excess capacity in this equilibrium.
Robust Stable Equilibrium without Excess Capacity. Assume now 1 <
 1(2). We will show that the continuous functions 1 and 2 must cross at least once
(i.e., a robust equilibrium exists), and that the slope condition is met (i.e., it is sta-
ble). First, in this case L
1(2) < `
1(1) or, equivalently, 
 1
2 ( 1;2) < 1( 1;1).
Second, as the standard of college 2 goes to innity, college 1's threshold converges to
u
1(1) < 1, the unique solution to 1 = E1( 1;1). This is the largest threshold that
college 1 can set given 1. Similarly, as the standard of college 1 goes to innity, col-
lege 2's threshold converges to u
2(2) < 1, the unique solution to 2 = E2(1; 2), i.e.
the largest threshold that college 2 can set given 2. Third, 1 and 2 are continuous.
By the Intermediate Value Theorem, they must cross at least once with the slope condi-
tion being satised (see Figure 8, right panel). Thus, a robust stable equilibrium exists
when 1 <  1(2). Moreover, in any robust equilibrium there is no excess capacity at
either college, since the best response functions satisfy 
 1
2 ( 1;2) < 1( 1;1).
Hence, a robust stable equilibrium exists for any 2 2 (0;1). Capacities are lled
35when 1   1(2), while there can be excess capacity at college 2 if 1 >  1(2). 
A.7 Stochastic Dominance in Robust Sorting Equilibria
Claim 3 (Sorting and the Caliber Distribution) In any robust sorting equilibrium,
the caliber distribution at college 1 rst-order stochastically dominates that at college 2.
Proof Step 1: Monotone Student Strategy Representation. A mono-
tone student strategy is represented by the partition of the set of types:
 = [0;2);C2 = [2;B);B = [B;1);C1 = [1;1) (15)
where 2 < B < 1 are dened by the intersection of the acceptance function with c=u,
2 = (1 c=1)=u (i.e., MB12 = c), and 2 = c=[u(1 1)] (i.e., MB21 = c), respectively.
Proof Step 2: Enrolled Caliber Densities. Fix  1 and  2. Let f1(x) and
f2(x) be the densities of calibers enrolled at colleges 1 and 2, respectively. Formally,
f1(x) =
1(x)f(x) R 1
B 1(t)f(t)dt
I[B;1)(x) (16)
f2(x) =
I[2;B](x)2(x)f(x) + (1   I[2;B](x))2(x)(1   1(x))f(x)
R B
2 2(s)f(s)ds +
R 1
B 2(s)(1   1(s))f(s)ds
I[2;1](x);(17)
where IA is the indicator function of the set A.
Proof Step 3: Log-Supermodularity of fi(x). We shall show that, if xL;xH 2
[0;1), with xH > xL, then f1(xH)f2(xL)  f2(xH)f1(xL); i.e., fi(x) is log-supermodular
in ( i;x), or it satises MLRP. The result follows as MLRP implies that the cdfs are
ordered by rst-order stochastic dominance.
Using (16) and (17), f1(xH)f2(xL)  f2(xH)f1(xL) is equivalent to
1HI[B;1)(xH)
 
I[2;B](xL)2L + (1   I[2;B](xL))2L(1   1L)

I[2;1](xL) 
1LI[B;1)(xL)
 
I[2;B](xH)2H + (1   I[2;B](xH))2H(1   1H)

I[2;1](xH);
(18)
where ij = i(xj), i = 1;2, j = L;H. It is easy to show that the only nontrivial case is
when xL;xH 2 [B;1] (in all the other cases, either both sides are zero, or only the right
36side is). If xL;xH 2 [B;1], then (18) becomes 1H2L(1   1L)  1L2H(1   1H), or
(1   G( 1 j xH))(1   G( 2 j xL))G( 1 j xL) 
(1   G( 1 j xL))(1   G( 2 j xH))G( 1 j xH):
(19)
Since g( j x) satises MLRP, it follows that G( j x) is decreasing in x, and hence
G( 1 j xL)  G( 1 j xH). Next, 1   G( j x) is log-supermodular in (x;), and hence
(1   G( 1 j xH))(1   G( 2 j xL))  (1   G( 1 j xL))(1   G( 2 j xH));
as  1 >  2 in a robust sorting equilibrium. Thus, (19) holds, thereby proving that fi(x)
is log-supermodular in ( i;x), and so F1 rst-order stochastically dominates F2. 
A.8 Comparative Statics: Proof of Theorem 3
(a) An Increase in College 1's Payoff. Let the initial equilibrium point E0 be
(e
1;e
2), and let the best reply loci after the increase in v be 0
1(2) and 0
2(1). Consider
0
2 = 
0 1
1 (e
1) (i.e. it is the  2 at which college 1's standards remain unchanged as v
increases). Since v increasing unambiguously shifts 1 to the right, 0
2 < e
2.
Now consider the point A = (e
1;0
2) shown in gure 5, and assume that student
applications are monotone at A (see the online appendix for the non-monotone case).
Then let the thresholds at E0 be (e
2;e
B;e
1) and at A be (0
2;0
B;0
1). Since college 2 has
lower standards, 0
2 < e
2. Recall that the marginal benet of an insurance application is
(1   1)2u. Since standards at college 1 are the same as before and the standards at
college 2 are lower, the payo to insurance is higher and 0
1 > e
1. So the set of applicants
to college 2 is strictly bigger than before. Also since college 1's standards and capacity
at A remain the same, its application set [B;1) must be the same as before, so that
e
B = 0
B. Since 0
2 < e
2, enrollment must rise on [e
2;e
B) and [e
B;e
1], and so even
ignoring the new applicants, college 2 has excess demand at A.
Thus, 0
2(e
1) > 0
2, which implies that 0
2 lies above the point A, and therefore
above 0
1 at that point (by construction of A). Since 0
1 is eventually entirely above 0
2
(see the proof of Theorem 2), they must cross somewhere to the right of A, and so there
exists a robust stable equilibrium E1 in which  1 > e
1.
(b) An increase in the common cost c. To align the logic with (a), we prove
instead that a decrease in c increases  1. Then 1 shifts right but 2 shifts ambiguously.
The result follows as in (a) if there is excess demand at A. Relative to E0, at A
37applications are cheaper and standards at college 2 have fallen. So again 0
2 < e
2 and
0
1 > e
1. By the argument in (a), e
B = 0
B, so enrollment rises on [e
2;e
B) and [e
B;e
1],
yielding the result.
(c) Increases in individual costs. We modify (15) for dierent costs: 1 is
dened by MB21 = c2, B by MB12 = c1, and 2 by 2u = c2. If c2 rises, then 1
drops, 2 rises, and B is unchanged; thus, the applicant pool at college 2 shrinks, and at
college 1 is unchanged. So the 2 curve shifts down, while 1 remains unchanged. The
functions cross at a lower threshold pair, and so both standards  1; 2 both fall. Next
consider an increase in c1. This raises B, which shrinks the applicant pool at college 1,
and increases the enrollment at college 2, at a xed admission standard. This shifts 1
left and 2 up. While the eect on the standard  2 is ambiguous, we now deduce that
 1 falls. Dierentiating (6) with respect to c1, and using Cramer's Rule:
@ 1
@c1
=
(@E2=@c1)(@E1=@ 2)   (@E1=@c1)(@E2=@ 2)
(dE1=d 1)(dE2=d 2)   (dE2=d 1)(dE1=d 2)
(20)
Since the robust equilibrium is stable, the slope of 1 is steeper that of 2, and thus the
denominator is positive. Let Pi(jy) be the portfolio density shift to college i at type 
given an increment to standard or cost y, and let S2(A) be the own-standards eect at
college 2 in set A. Then parse the enrollment derivatives into the portfolio and standards
eects: dE1=dc1 = P1(Bjc1) < 0, dE2=d 2 = i=2;B;1P2(ij 2)   S2(C2)   S2(B) < 0,
dE2=dc1 = P2(Bjc1) > 0, and dE1=d 2 = P1(Bj 2) > 0. If c1 slightly rises, then B
rises by some  > 0. Thus, college 1 loses mass f(B)1 of students, and college 2 gains
mass f(B)12 of students who would have gone to college 1. Likewise, if  2 slightly
rises, then B falls by some 0, and college 1 gains mass f(B)10 and college 2 loses
mass f(B)120. Thus, P1(Bj 2)P2(Bjc1)   P1(Bjc1)P2(Bj 2) equals
[f(B)1
0][f(B)12]   [f(B)1][f(B)12
0] = 0
Hence, the numerator in (20) reduces to
 P1(Bjc1)[P2(2j 2) + P(1j 2)   S2(C2)   S2(B)] < 0
(d) Caliber improvement. In a robust sorting equilibrium, the applicant pool at
college 1 consists of calibers x 2 [B;1). When  1 falls in equilibrium, B must rise
since college 1 has the same capacity as before. Let (0
B;0
1) be the old equilibrium pair
38and (1
B;1
1) the new one, with 0
B < 1
B and 0
1 > 1
1. Then the distribution function
of enrolled students at college 1 under equilibrium i = 0;1 is:
F
i
1(x) =
R x
i
B (1   G(i
1jt))f(t)dt
R 1
i
B (1   G(i
1jt))f(t)dt
We must show F 1
1(x)  F 0
1(x) for all x 2 [1
B;1). For any x, the denominators
on both sides equal k1, so cancel them. Now notice that 0 = F 1
1(1
B) < F 0
1(1
B)
and limx!1 F 1
1(x) = limx!1 F 0
1(x) = 1. Since both functions are continuous in x,
if @F 1
1=@x > @F 0
1=@x for all x 2 [1
B;1), then F 1
1(x) < F 0
1(x). But this requires
(1   G(1
1jx))f(x) > (1   G(0
1jx))f(x), which follows from 1
1 < 0
1. 
A.9 Sorting and Non-Sorting Equilibria: Proof of Theorem 4
Part (a): College 2 is Too Good. We construct acceptance chances (1(x);h(1(x)))
such that student behavior is non-monotone, college enrollment equals capacity, and
1(x) and h((1(x)) obey the requirements of Theorem 1. Then that theorem yields
existence of a signal distribution with non-monotone equilibrium student behavior.
Step 1: The Acceptance Function and Student Behavior. When u > 0:5,
the secant from the origin to MB12 = c falls as 1 tends to c=(1   u) | as in the left
panel of Figure 6. So for some z < c=(1   u), a line from the origin to (z;1) slices
the MB12 curve twice. Let h : [0;1] ! [0;1] be dened by h(1) = 1=z and on [0;z),
and h(1) = 1 for 1  z. Observe that h(0) = 0 and h(1) = 1, and that h is weakly
increasing, with both h(1)=1 and [1 h(1)]=[1 1] weakly decreasing, so h obeys the
double secant property. Now consider student behavior. Moving along the acceptance
relation h, students with acceptance chance 1 < (c z)=u will apply nowhere; those in
the interval [(c z)=u;a) will apply to college 2 only; those between [a;a] will apply to
both; those in (a;c=(1   u)) will apply to college 2 only, those in [c=(1   u);1   (c=u)]
will apply to both, and those above 1   (c=u) will apply to college 1; where a;a are the
pair of intersections with the MB12 curve. Hence, student behavior is non-monotone.
Step 2: Transforming the type space. Notice that if one chooses a monotone
function 1(x), then we induce a distribution G(a) = P(1(X) < a) (i.e., the probability
that a random student X has acceptance chance at college 1 less than a). Conversely,
we can obtain any distribution G(a) by choosing 1(x) = G 1(F(x)). The resulting
function 1(x) thus obtained will be smooth, monotone and onto provided that G has a
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Figure 9: Existence of Sorting and Non-Sorting Robust Equilibria. We depict
the proof of Theorem 4. In the left panel, when 2 falls, 2 shifts up to 0
2, inducing a robust
non-sorting equilibrium at E1. In the right panel, when 1 falls, 1 shifts right to 0
1. The
standards at the new robust equilibrium E1 obey  2 < ( 1), i.e., the equilibrium is sorting.
continuous and strictly positive density over [0;1]. Therefore, we can restate our problem
as choosing a G with these properties and such that the enrollment equations hold.
Step 3: Enrollment. The enrollment equations are given by:
Z a
a
adG(a) +
Z 1
c
1 u
adG(a) = 1
Z a
c z
u
a
 z
dG(a) +
Z a
a
(1   a)
a
 z
dG(a) +
Z  z
a
a
 z
dG(a) +
Z c
1 u
 z
dG(a) +
Z 1  c
u
c
1 u
(1   a)dG(a) = 2:
We now decouple the equations by letting G(a) G(a) = G(1 (c=u)) G(c=(1 u)) =
 for some small  (e.g. by using a uniform density). It is clear that the resulting
individual integral equations have an innite number of solutions for G(a) on those
regions. Choosing one of them completes the proof. For then Theorem 1 yields a signal
density g(jx) and thresholds  1 >  2 such that h(1(x)) is the acceptance function.
Part (b): College 2 is Too Small. The proof is constructive. Consider
(1;2) = (c;c=u) on the line 2 = 1=u. The acceptance function evaluated at 1 = c
lies below c=u when
 (c; 1; 2) < c=u: (21)
We will restrict attention to pairs ( 1; 2) such that (21) holds. In this case, any student
who applies to college starts by adding college 1 to his portfolio, and this happens as
40soon as 1(x)  c, or when x  (c; 1). Then enrollment at college 1 is given by
E1( 1; 2) =
Z 1
(c; 1)
(1   G( 1jx))f(x)dx;
which is independent of  2. Thus, for any capacity 1 2 (0;1), a unique threshold
 1(1) solves 1 = E1( 1; 2). (The 
 1
1 function is \vertical" when (21) holds, since
the applicant pool at college 1 does not depend on college 2's admissions threshold.)
The analysis above allows us to restrict attention to nding robust equilibria within
the set of ( 1; 2) such that  1 =  1(1) and  2 satises  (c; 1(1); 2) < c=u.
Enrollment at college 2 is given by
E2( 1(1); 2) =
Z
B
G( 1(1)jx)(1   G( 2jx))f(x)dx;
which is continuous, decreasing in  2, and increasing in  1 (see Claim 2). Thus, 2 =
E2( 1(1); 2) yields  2 = 2( 1(1);2), which is strictly decreasing in 2.
Given 1, let  2(1) = E2( 1(1); 1(1)) be such that equilibrium ensues if both
colleges set the same threshold.36 Since 2 strictly falls in 2, for any 2 <  2(1), a
robust equilibrium exists with  2 >  1(1). Then (i) for any 1 2 (0;1) and 2 2
(0;  2(1)], there is a unique robust equilibrium with  1 =  1(1) and  2   1(1),
having (ii) non-monotone college and student behavior (Figure 9, left).37 
Part (c): Conditions for Equilibrium Sorting. We prove that there exists
1(2) > 0 such that if 1  1(2) and u  0:5, then there are only robust sorting
equilibria and neither college has excess capacity.
Fix 2 2 (0;1). We rst show that the robust stable equilibrium with no excess
capacity derived in Claim 2 is also sorting when the capacity of college 1 is small enough.
More precisely, there is a threshold 1(2), smaller than the bound  1(2) dened in the
proof of Claim 2, such that for all 1 2 (0;1(2)), there is a pair of admissions thresholds
( 1; 2) that satises 1 = E1( 1; 2), 2 = E2( 1; 2), and  2 < ( 1) (i.e., a robust
sorting equilibrium), and @1=@ 2@2=@ 1 < 1 (i.e., the robust equilibrium is stable).
The proof uses three easily-veried properties of the  function implicitly dened
by inequality (14): (a)  is strictly increasing; (b)  2 = ( 1) ! 1 as  1 ! 1; (c)
 1 =  1( 2) !  1 as  2 !  1.
36It is not dicult to show that  (c; 1; 2) < c=u is satised if  2   1(1).
37We are not ruling out the existence of another robust equilibrium that does not satisfy (21).
41For any 1 2 (0;  1(2)), we know from Claim 2 that there exists a pair ( 1; 2) that
satises 1 = E1( 1; 2) and 2 = E2( 1; 2), with (@1=@ 2)(@2=@ 1) < 1.
Claim 4 The pair ( 1; 2) is a robust sorting equilibrium when 1 is suciently small.
Proof: Let M(2) = f( 1; 2)j2 = E2( 1; 2) and  2 = ( 1)g. Graphically, this is
the set of all pairs at which  2 = 2( 1;2) crosses  2 = ( 1).
If M(2) = ? we are done, for then  2 = 2( 1;2) < ( 1) for all  1, including
those at which 1 = E1( 1; 2) and 2 = E2( 1; 2). To see this, note that (i)  1 =
 1( 2) !  1 as  2 !  1, while we proved in Claim 2 that  1 = 
 1
2 ( 2;2)
converges to l
1(2) >  1. Also, (ii)  2 = ( 1) ! 1 as  1 ! 1, while we proved in
Claim 2 that  2 = 2( 1;2) converges to u
2(2) < 1. Properties (i) and (ii) reveal
that if 2 and  do not intersect, then 2 is everywhere below .
If M(2) 6= ?, let (s
1(2);s
2(2)) = supM(2), which is nite by property (b) of
( 1) and since  2 = 2( 1;2) converges to u
2(2) < 1 as  1 goes to innity (see
the proof of Claim 2). Now, as 1 goes to zero,  1 = 1( 2;1) goes to innity for any
value of  2, for college 1 becomes increasingly more selective to ll its dwindling capacity.
Since  2 is bounded above by u
2(2), there exists a threshold 1(2)   1(2) such that,
for all 1 2 (0;1(2)), the aforementioned pair ( 1; 2) that satises 1 = E1( 1; 2)
and 2 = E2( 1; 2) is strictly bigger than (s
1(2);s
2(2)), thereby showing that it also
satises  2 < ( 1). Hence, a robust sorting stable equilibrium exists for any 2 and
1 2 (0;1(2)), with both colleges lling their capacities (see Figure 9, right panel).
To nish the proof, notice that, if there are multiple robust equilibria, both colleges
ll their capacity in all of them (graphically, the conditions on capacities ensure that 2
starts above 1 for low values of  1 and eventually ends below it). Moreover, adjusting
the bound 1(2) downward if needed, all robust equilibria are sorting (graphically, for
1 suciently small, the set of pairs at which 1 and 2 intersect are all below ). 
A.10 Aliated Evaluations
We now show that if students and colleges see noisy conditionally iid signals of calibers,
then this is formally a special case of (F).
Let t be a student's true caliber, unknown to him and colleges. It has density p(t)
on [0;1]. After seeing the signal realization X = x, drawn with type-dependent density
f(xjt), the student updates his beliefs to p(tjx) = f(xjt)p(t)=f(x). If a student of caliber
42t applies to a college, the college observes a signal  drawn with density (jt) and cdf
 (jt) on [0;1]. If a student applies to both colleges, then they observe conditionally iid
signals. We assume that f(xjt) and (jt) obey the strict MLRP.
Dene the conditional joint density of signals g(1;2jx) =
R 1
0 (1jt)(2jt)p(tjx)dt.
Notice that g integrates to 1, and so is a valid density. Also, as an integral of products
of log-supermodular functions, it inherits this property, by Karlin and Rinott (1980). In
other words, the signals are aliated. Next, dene the density f(x) =
R 1
0 f(xjt)p(t)dt.
We now reinterpret the signal x in the conditional iid case as the student true caliber.
To show that this model is a special case of (F), we prove that student and college
optimizations have the same solutions as in the conditional iid case.
Student Behavior. It suces to express the chances of two acceptance events for
the conditional iid model without reference to the type t, and thus as in the aliated
model (F). First, the unconditional acceptance chance at college i = 1;2 is
i(x) =
Z 1
0
(1    (ijt))p(tjx)dt =
Z 1
0
Z 1
i
(ijt)p(tjx)didt =
Z 1
 i
Z 1
0
g(i;jjx)djdi
Next, the probability of being rejected at 1 and accepted at 2 is
Z 1
0
 (1jt)(1    (2jt))p(tjx)dt =
Z 1
0
Z  1
0
Z 1
 2
(2jt)(1jt)p(tjx)1d2dt
=
Z  1
0
Z 1
 2
g(1;2jx)d1d2:
College Behavior. It likewise suces to express the enrollment functions without
reference to the student type t. For instance, for college 1,
E1( 1; 2) =
Z 1
0
Z
C1[B
f(xjt)dx
 Z 1
1
(1jt)d1
!
p(t)dt
=
Z
C1[B
Z 1
1
Z 1
0
(1jt)f(xjt)p(t)dt

d1dx
=
Z
C1[B
 Z 1
1
Z 1
0
g(1;2jx)d2d1
!
f(x)dx:
The analysis of college 2 is analogous and thus omitted. 
43A.11 Armative Action: Proof of Theorem 5 (a)
Step 1: Equilibrium Conditions. Here, we assume a continuous signal cdf derivative
Gx. Given any discount pair (1;2), the capacity equations with two groups are:
1 = E

1( 1   1; 2   2) + (1   )E
N
1 ( 1; 2) (22)
2 = E

2( 1   1; 2   2) + (1   )E
N
2 ( 1; 2); (23)
where E
i ;EN
i are the respective fractions of targeted and non-targeted groups enrolled at
college i, dened just as in (4) and (5), for the sets of signals (15). Since the signal density
g = G and its derivative Gx are both continuous, all derivatives of the enrollment
function (using Leibnitz rule) are continuous too.
Step 2: Single College Preference Case. Dierentiating equations (22)
and (23) with respect to 1:
J

@ 1
@1
=
X
i=1;2
( 1)
i+1 @E
i
@( 1   1)


@E
3 i
@( 2   2)
+ (1   )
@EN
3 i
@ 2

J

@ 2
@1
=
X
i=1;2
( 1)
i @E
i
@( 1   1)


@E
3 i
@( 1   1)
+ (1   )
@EN
3 i
@ 1

where the denominator, from Cramer's Rule, equals
J =


@E
1
@( 1   1)
+ (1   )
@EN
1
@ 1


@E
2
@( 2   2)
+ (1   )
@EN
2
@ 2

 


@E
1
@( 2   2)
+ (1   )
@EN
1
@ 2


@E
2
@( 1   1)
+ (1   )
@EN
2
@ 1

is positive in any robust stable equilibrium | i.e. the two group version of the condition
that the slope of 1 exceed the slope of 2 in x4 and xA.8. Now, @ 1=@1 =  > 0
and @ 2=@1 = 0 when 1 = 2 = 0, because the derivatives of the function E
i ;EN
i at
colleges i = 1;2 coincide. Thus, the feedback eects vanish when 1 = 2 = 0, and are
negligible in a neighborhood of it, by continuity of the enrollment derivatives.
Since 1 = 1, it follows that  1 increases while  1   1 decreases when 1 goes
up, as @( 1   1)=@1j1=0 =    1 < 0.
The analysis of the derivatives of  i, i = 1;2, with respect to 2 is analogous.
Step 3: Both College Preference Case. Suppose now that 1 = 2 =  = 0
44and thus 1 = 2 =  = 0. Now let  increase. Replacing in the analysis above
i, i = 1;2, by  and dierentiating, yields, after evaluating the expression at  = 0,
@ i=@ =  > 0, i = 1;2. As before  i    goes down, thereby proving the result. 
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